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In 1824, the American schooner Fox sailed into Charleston harbor with 
seasoned mariner and Rhode Island native Amos Daley on board. When 
officials boarded the ship, they interrogated the captain and crew before 
cuffing Daley and hauling him off to the Charleston jail, where he 
remained until the Fox was set to leave harbor. Daley's detainment 
occurred because 16 months earlier the South Carolina General 
Assembly had enacted a statute barring the entrance of all free people of 
color into the state. Unlike other antebellum state statutes limiting black 
immigration, this law extended further, stretching to include in its prohibi-
tion maritime laborers aboard temporarily docked, commercial vessels. 
This particular section of the law was passed on the assumption that 
such sailors inspired slave insurrection and thereby posed a direct threat 
to the safety and welfare of the citizenry. Over the course of the next 
four decades, the states of North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas would join South Carolina in passing 
statutes, commonly referred to as the "Seamen Acts," which limited the 
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ingress of free black mariners. Amos Daley was only one of""' 10,000 sai-
lors directly affected by these particularly Southern regulations. 1 
In court, Daley's attorneys attacked the South Carolina variant on two 
particular fronts. First, they claimed the recent Supreme Court case of 
Gibbons v. Ogden invalidated all state regulatory statutes, including the 
Seamen Act, which interfered with Congress's exclusive authority to regu-
late interstate and international commerce. Although actually misreading 
the Great Steamboat Case, Daley's counsel believed that Marshall's strong 
language in the opinion meant the inevitable demise of seamen restrictions. 
Second, Daley's attorneys claimed that the law was a blatant violation of 
the Constitution's Privileges and lmmunities Clause. They argued that 
the clause extended to Daley by virtue of his Rhode lsland citizenship, 
and that South Carolina had no constitutional authority to restrict the sai-
lor's liberty of movement.2 
The story of Amos Daley is a fitting place to begin this study of the 
Seamen Acts, because the specific arguments made at his trial serve as a 
practical shorthand for the ways that legal historians have generally 
approached this set of laws. They have found them useful when highlight-
ing the meandering Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the antebe11um era. 
I. State v. Daley reprinted in Charleston Mercury, June 23, 1824. The following list com-
prises the initial ~tate statutes against black sailors, and when I reference any of the individ-
ual Seamen Acts below, I am citing these particular statutes unless otherwise noted. Acts 
Passed at the Annual Session of the General Assembly of the State of Alabama 
(Tuscaloosa, 1838}, 134-36; Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida 
( 1832), 143-45; Laws of the State of Mississippi Passed at a Regular Biennial Session of 
the Legislature, Held in the City of Jackson in January and February A.D. 1842 
(Jackson, 1842), 65- 71; Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Fifteenth Legislature of 
the State of Louisiana: Begun and Held in the City of New-Orleans, December /3, 1841 
(New Orleans, 1842), 308-18; General Laws of the Sixth Legislature of the State of 
Texas, Passed at Its Adjourned Session, Convened July 7, 1856 (Austin, 1857), 48-49; 
Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Passed in 
December, 1822 (Columbia, 1823), 11- 14; Acts of the General Assembly of the State of 
Georgia Passed in Nov. and Dec./829, 168-71; and Acts Passed by the General 
Assembly of the State of North Carolina at the Session of 1830-1 (Raleigh, 1861), 29-
31. No reliable statistical evidence exists with which to accurately enumerate the total num-
ber of sailors affected by the many Seamen Acts during their enforcement, although 
W. Jeffrey Bolster puts the number above I 0,000. See W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: 
African-American Sailors in the Age of Sail (Cambridge, MA, 1997}, 206. 
2. Charleston Mercury, June 23, 1824. Daley's attorneys also argued that the Seamen Act 
should not apply to the sailor because he was not "black," but rather of Native American 
descent. As the revised 1823 statute targeted sailors specifically "descended from negroes, 
mulattoes, and mustizos [sic]," Daley ought to have been beyond its reach, despite state wit-
nesses testifying that his ''wooly hair'' and "dark complexion" disproved his Narragansett 
heritage. For the amended 1823 South Carolina statute, see David McCord, ed., Statures 
at Large of South Carolina, Volume 5, (Columbia, 1839), 220. 
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In these accounts, the Seamen Acts both informed and were shaped by an 
utter lack of consensus regarding the proper interface between state poli-
cing authority and federal power over commerce. Other studies have 
used the Seamen Acts as evidence of the precariousness of 
African-American citizenship and the failure of interstate comity to guar-
antee the protection of Northern African-Americans who journeyed 
South. Often culminating their works with Dred Scott v. Sandford, these 
histories tend to reduce the Seamen Acts to their influence on judicial doc-
trine concerning black citizenship in the early republic. In short, the legal 
historiography of the Seamen Acts has fixated on these two particular con-
stitutional themes. 3 
In this article, I depart from these important studies in two ways. First, 
the Seamen Acts occupy the center of the story instead of sitting on the 
3. For examples of works relating the Seamen Acts to citizenship, see Don Fehrenbacher, 
The Dred Scot/ Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (New York, 1978J and 
Austin Allen, Origins ofthe Dred Scott Case: Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Supreme 
Court, 1837-1857 (Athens, GA, 2006). For examples of works linking the Seamen Acts 
to the Commerce Clause, see Donald Morgan, Justice William Johnson, The First 
Dissenter: The Career and Constitutional Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Justice 
(Columbia, SC, 1954); and Norman Williams, "Gibbons," New York University Law 
Review 79 (2004): 1398-1499. Some scholars have linked citizenship and the Commerce 
Clause. See, for example, Scott Wallace Stucky, "Elkison v. Deliesseline: Race and the 
Constitution in South Carolina, 1823," North Carolina Central Law Journal 14 (1983-
1984): 361-405. Also, some other legal scholars have looked to the laws as a way to under-
stand other constitutional issues, such as the treaty-making power and immigration. See 
David Golove, "Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power," Michigan Law Review 98 (2000): 1075-
319; and Gerald Neuman, "The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875)," Columbia Law Review 93 (1993): 1833-901. Of course legal historians are not 
the only scholars to investigate the laws. For decades, the definitive work was a pair of 
essays in diplomatic history. See Philip Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States, and the 
Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848," Journal ofSouthern History 1 (1935): 3-28 and Philip 
Hamer, "British Consuls and the Negro Seamen Acts, 185o-1860," Journal of Southern 
History l ( 1935): 138-68. For the Seamen Acts place in South Carolina political culture gen-
erally, see Alan January, "The First Nullification: The Negro Seamen Acts Controversy in 
South Carolina, 1822-1860," (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1976). Literary scholar 
Edlie Wong has used the Seamen Acts to illustrate broader themes of race and status in 
nineteenth-century travel literature in Neither Fugitive Nor Free: Atlantic Slavery, 
Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel (New York, 2009). Scholars on free blacks 
in general and black sailors in particular have talked about the Seamen Acts. For example, 
Ira Berlin, Slaves without Ma.<Jters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York, 
1974); John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro In North Carolina, 1790-1860 (Chapel Hill, 
1943 ); H. E. Sterx, The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana (Rutherford, NJ, 1972); 
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, 
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000); and 
W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks, 198-214. 
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periphery. Second, I have chosen a different analytic lens in my examin-
ation. Rather than focus on how the Seamen Acts informed specific consti-
tutional developments, such as Conunerce Clause or citizenship 
jurisprudence, I am more concerned with understanding how the laws 
"happened" in the antebellum South. Taken together, the laws created a 
specific legal regime of exclusion, a regulatory technology that represented 
one aspect of what William Novak has described as the "well-regulated 
society." Although this study largely supports Novak's contention that 
antebellum Americans acknowledged, even embraced, the necessity of 
an active and near ubiquitous governmental authority to act for "the 
people's welfare," it also depicts a very complicated and contested process. 
Antebellum Southerners may have conceded or even celebrated extensive 
state regulatory action, but they also disagreed, at times vehemently, about 
exactly what their regulatory regime ought to look like. They fought over 
the precise locus and limits of regulatory authority, which threats demanded 
governmental intetvention, and the appropriate means of enforcement. This 
investigation of the Seamen Acts illustrates some of the ideological, juris-
dictional, and institutional friction over regulation that animated the con-
duct of governance in the antebellum South. The Seamen Acts, like 
other forms of regulatory law, were constructed and maintained amid a 
firestorm of competing ideologies, interests, and legal claims.4 
In the pages that follow, I identify two broad arenas of conflict that arose 
with the enactment and enforcement of the Seamen Acts. The first arena 
encompasses debates over the efficacy of regulation. It considers both 
the contested process by which white Southerners came to identify black 
sailors as threats to society, and the volatile arguments over the relative 
merits of regulating them. Were black sailors dangerous, and was it worth-
while for jurisdictions to outlaw their ingress? The answers were never 
obvious or unanimous. They varied across time and space, and they reveal 
some of the ideological and economic cleavages within Southern society, 
as well as shifting international influences~ Within the second arena of 
conflict, the primary question was not if sailors ought to regulated, but 
how they should or could be regulated. Because of the rather draconian fea-
tures of many of the laws, protestors offered sharp critiques of enforce-
ment, with some erstwhile critics even employing individual rights or 
international law as potential limits to regulatory authority. Although I 
4. William Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill, 1996). Novak sought to prove that a regulatory state actually existed 
in the nineteenth century United States, a daunting task considering several enduring myths 
about the American state, or the lack thereof, in the antebellum period. Novak identified sev-
eral types of regulatory law that penneated the lives of everyday Americans, from statutes 
securing public safety and security to codes protecting public morals and health. 
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separate these two broad arenas in my analysis, I do not mean to suggest 
that they operated exclusively. Nor do I assert that they exhaust all of 
the unexplored legal conflicts associated with the Seamen Acts' saga. 
Rather, they are meant to clarify some of debates over seamen regulations 
that have escaped legal historians, and to integrate those debates into exist-
ing constitutional histories of the laws.5 
The Policy Debate: Defining the Threat and Assessing. 
the Merits of Regulation 
In this section, I describe the contested process by which free black sailors 
became identified as dangerous outsiders, and subsequently targeted for 
specific forms of regulation. Even before Nathaniel Turner's revolt cano-
nized the term "outside agitation" and infused it with robust explanatory 
power regarding the incidence of slave revolt, some white Southerners 
were deploying the related idea of "moral contagion" to describe catalysts 
for racial unrest. Beginning in South Carolina in 1822 and radiating out-
ward, many white Southerners considered foreign (i.e., from beyond 
their respective states) free blacks to be inherently corrupted-or 
infected-and intent on undermining the Southern slave system. Free 
black sailors emerged as a particular cause of concern. Both state and 
local authorities enacted specific regulations geared toward thwarting the 
ingress of these dangerous sailors and thereby prevent poisonous ideas 
from creating an epidemic among local slaves. From the very outset, how-
ever, white Southerners fought over the presence of "moral contagion" and 
the relative merits of seamen regulation. By barring the entrance black sai-
lors, these laws also interrupted commercial networks and threatened 
immediate and long-lasting economic problems for the merchants and tra-
ders in Southern port cities. 
Discovering a Moral Contagion 
The origins of the first Seamen Act are quite easy to discern. The law came 
into effect in South Carolina in 1822 immediately following the infamous 
5. Space constraints prevent the inclusion of a third arena of conflict that addresses the 
jurisdiction of regulation. This sphere concerns not if or how the sailors should be regulated, 
but what authority was competent to make such determinations. Questions regarding extra· 
territorial jurisdiction, federal relations, and local-state relations animated this particular 
arena. For a similar approach to local-state debates, see Laura Edwards, The People and 
Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post· 
Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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Denmark Vesey Conspiracy. During that summer, more than 100 slaves 
and free blacks allegedly coordinated the largest slave rebellion in 
United States history. Although no overt acts of insurrection actually 
occurred, investigators and trial courts meted out swift and severe punish-
ment, often with scant evidence. With people's taste for sensationalism 
piqued, and with the city in a state of collective shock, dozens of convicted 
conspirators were hanged from the gallows, and many more were exiled 
from the state. 6 
The city's white population constructed a narrative of causation for the 
botched revolt, and within it Denmark Vesey assumed Herculean charac-
teristics. He was the mastermind, and because of his central role, white 
Charlestonians sought to explain the impetus behind his murderous 
designs. Mayor James Hamilton wrote that Vesey was once an 
Atlantic-savvy sailor who had traveled for years around the revolutionary 
Atlantic and even resided in St. Domingue immediately before the Haitian 
Revolution. The official trial "transcripts," which were actually authored 
after the executions by two of the sitting magistrates, confidently pro-
claimed that Vesey kept close contact with transnational black sailors. 
These men apparently linked Charleston to Haiti and West Africa. The 
"transcripts" also revealed to eager readers Vesey's recruitment strategies. 
Anonymous witnesses supposedly testified that Vesey often recounted stor-
ies of Haiti's glory to win converts and inspire his legions. In this way, city 
officials portrayed Vesey as the propeller of insurrection, the contaminating 
influence on otherwise passive local slaves.? 
This concept of contamination as a prime catalyst for the rebellion 
suggested to some people that governmental officials ought to be much 
more diligent in sifting through the messages being introduced from 
abroad. Because the dangerous Atlantic helped inspire the Vesey conspi-
racy, (or at least this is what people used as a rationale) only a new program 
of Atlantic exchange, one anchored by a systematic rejection of dangerous 
people and ideologies, could prevent another such insurrection in the 
6. Robert Tinkler, James Hamilton of South Carolina (Baton Rouge, 1994); and Edward 
Pearson, Designs against Charleston, The Trial Record of the Denmark Vesey Slave 
Conspiracy of 1822 (Chapel Hill, 1999). Appendix 2. 
7. James Hamilton, An Account of the Late Intended Insurrection among a Portion of the 
Blacks of the City of Charleston, South Carolina (Charleston, 1822); and Lionel H. Kennedy 
and Thomas Parker, An Official Report of the Trial of Sundry Negroes Charged with an 
Attempt to Raise an Insurrection in the State of South Carolina (Charleston, 1822). See 
also Wong, Neither Fugitive Nor Free, 184-96. This reading of the Vesey affair does not 
preclude the simultaneous apprehension that white Cbarlestonians maintained over local 
free people of color. Many of the authors cited above also harbored deep suspicions 
about the city's freemen. My point is to highlight the changing attitudes toward outsiders. 
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future. Newspaper editors, attorneys, city officials, and others sought to 
couple local adjustments to port regulation with statewide statutory reforms 
regarding free people of color, in the hope of containing these dangerous 
forces. Both municipal authorities and the South Carolina legislature 
took these suggestions to heart. In addition to outlawing the pennanent 
immigration of free people of color, the state General Assembly also barred 
th~ temporary ingress of all free people of color from outside the state, 
including workers aboard commercial vessels. According to the new 
law, if any such maritime laborer arrived in port, local sheriffs were to 
escort him to jail until his vessel was set to leave the harbor. 8 
The exploding narrative of contamination found its first champion in 
Charleston attorney Benjamin Hunt. It was Hunt who first made an explicit 
and emphatic link between biological contagion and the dangers posed by 
Atlantic-savvy black sailors. In defending the law against black sailors in 
federal court in 1823, Hunt proclaimed, "We have much more reason to 
believe in the moral contagion they introduce, than in the importation of 
yellow-fever ... In South Carolina, we think the presence of a free negro, 
fresh from the lectures of an Abolition Society equally dangerous." 
Although Hunt may have been first, he was not alone, and others expanded 
on the contagion theme. One editorialist quipped, "To permit such 
persons ... [as the] colored population into this state from the North and 
elsewhere, with their known habits, feelings, and principles, animated 
and emboldened as they are by the philanthropy of the day .. .is to introduce 
a moral pestilence which is to destroy subordination in the slave, and with 
it the state itself ... It is a moral contagion. It is the Upas Tree, whose touch 
is death." Another article pinpointed the origins of the contagion in the 
French and Haitian Revolutions, "from which came licentiousness ... irre-
ligion, atheism, and every species of madness and every wrong principle of 
enthusiasm. •'9 
8. For some examples of the calls for legislative changes in the aftermath of Vesey, see 
Achates [Thomas Pinckney], Reflections, Occasioned by the late Disturbances in 
Charleston (Charleston, 1822); "Memorial of the Citizens of Charleston to the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the State of South Carolina" (Charleston, 1822), in A 
Documentary History of American Industrial Society, ed. John R. Commons et al. 
(Cleveland, 1910), 2:104-13; and Edwin Holland, "A Refutation of Calumnies Circulated 
Aga inst the Southern and Western States . .. " (Charleston, 1822). in Denmark Vesey: The 
Slave Conspiracy of 1822, ed. Robert Starobin (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1970). On the 
increased dangers of Atlantic abolitionism, see, for example, [Robert Turnbull and Isaac 
Holmes], "Caroliniensis No. 5," Charleston Mercury, August 22, 1823 . 
9. Benjamin F. Hunt, "The Argument of Benj. Faneuil Hunt in the case of the arrest of the 
Person claiming to be a British Seaman, under the 3d section of the State Act of Dec. 1822, 
in relation to Negroes, &c before the Hon. Judge Johnson, Circuit Judge of the United States, 
for the 6th Circuit" (Charleston, 1823), in Slavery, Race, and the American Legal System, 
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The rhetorical power of "contagion" was immense, and Hunt and his 
compatriots were clever to deploy it. The early republic was a very sickly 
place, and the only thing that could spread with greater speed and malig-
nancy than contagious dis~ase was the fear of an imminent pandemic. 
Although scientists and medical men disagreed about "contagionism"-
the belief that epidemic diseases traveled from an infected person to a 
healthy person-most laypeople were sound adherents of the philosophy. 
News of contagion and epidemic shook cities and k>wns during the period, 
invoking the specter of mass death, the collapse of government, and the 
breakdown of society. When Benjamin Hunt compared black sai lors to 
people infected with yellow fever, he was speaking a language 
Americans understood all too well. 10 
The application of the rhetoric of contagion to black Atlantic mariners 
expanded far beyond the city of Charleston. In 1829, Boston clothier 
David Walker published An Appeal to the Coloured Persons of the 
World, a manifesto that called for slaves and free blacks across the 
Atlantic to demand their liberty, and if denied, to resort to bloody insurrec-
tion. When port officials in New Bern and Wilmington, North Carolina and 
Savannah, Georgia uncovered clandestine shipments of the "dangerous 
pamphlet," lawmakers in both states sprang into action. In addition to 
criminalizing slave literacy and the introduction of "incendiary" materials, 
the legislatures in both states also enacted laws against black sailors on the 
assumption that they would be the likely distributors of Walker's Appeal. 
Quite revealingly, both legislatures codified their regulations of black sai-
lors under the banner "Quarantine," suggesting the deep inroads the conta-
gion narrative had made from its Charleston birthplace. 1 1 
By labeling the laws explicitly as "quarantines," lawmakers in North 
Carolina and Georgia petpetuated the discourse as well. ln 1831 , North 
1700-1872, ed. Paul Finkelman (New York, 1988), 2:2-3; and Charleston Mercury, 
September 6 and 13, 1823. 
10. On contagionism and epidemic disease in the early republic, see Alan Kraut, Silent 
Travelers: Genns. Genes. and the "Immigrant Menace" (Baltimore, 1995), 11-49; John 
H. Howell, Bring Out Your Dead: The Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Philadelphia in 
1793 (Philadelphia, 1949); Charles Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States in 
I 832, I 849, and I 866 (Chicago, 1962, 1987); and several of the essays in Charles 
Rosenberg and Janet Golden, eds., Framing Disease: Studies in Cultural History (New 
Brunswick, 1997). Also helpful is Martin Pemick, "Contagion and Culture," American 
Literary History 14 (2002): 858-65. 
II. Hasan Crocket, "The Incendiary Pamphlet: David Walker's Appeal in Georgia," 
Journal of Negro History 86 (200 1}: 305-18; Clement Eaton, "A Dangerous Pamphlet in 
the Old South," Journal of Southern History 3 (1936), 325-32; and Cary Howard, 'The 
Georgia Reaction to David Walker's Appeal," (Master's Thesis, University of Georgia, 
1967). 
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Carolina Superior Court Judge Robert Strange instructed the jury in a case 
against "quarantined" British mariners, "As a state, in her own sovereign 
capacity, has a right. .. to prevent the introduction within her limits of feb-
rile or pestiferous contagion, so has a state an equal right to legislate to 
prevent the influence of moral contagion." In Georgia, state officials 
were so persuasive in their deployment of the contagion-quarantine 
language they convinced British officials in London to acquiesce to the 
regulation. According to one member of the Board ofTrdde, the quarantine 
might be "absurd," but because the Georgia government supposed itself in 
"extreme jeopardy," it could pass whatever measures it wanted to, to "avert 
a supposed danger" \Yithout compromising any bilateral agreement or "the 
law of Nations."12 
Expositors of the contagion narrative accumulated a host of new adher-
ents during the early 1830s. In 1831, Nathaniel Turner rampaged through 
Southampton, Virginia, leaving dozens dead and thousands more terrified 
of an imminent race war. Following Turner's arrest and confession, 
Virginia officials attributed his motivations to the "outside agitation" of 
·Baptist ministers and radical abolitionist writers, who supposedly infected 
the precocious slave. Later the same year, Jamaican authorities blamed 
subversive Baptist missionaries for instigating the massive Christmas 
Rebellion that left dozens of plantations in flames and Jamaican authorities 
fearful of a Haitian-style revolution. Convinced that insurrection was being 
introduced from without, Jamaican officials demanded an immediate end to 
Baptist missionary activity on the island. Well aware of both rebellions and 
the "outside agitation" that supposedly inspired them, the territorial legis-
lature in Florida enacted its own Seamen Act in 1832. The "contagion of 
liberty" would not infect Florida slaves without a fight from legislators. 13 
12. Robert Strange graduated from Washington College in Lexington, Virginia before his 
family moved to Fayetteville, North Carolina. Strange studied law there, was admitted to the 
state bar, and was elected to the State General Assembly in 1821. During the mid-1820s, 
Strange became a dedicated Jacksonian. From 1826 until 1836, he served as a superior 
court judge before being appointed to the United States Senate to complete the vacated 
term of Willie Mangum. Strange was elected to his own term in the United States Senate 
the next year. T n 1840, he resigned rather than succumb to the dictates of the newly ascen-
dant Whig state legislature. See William S. Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina 
Biography (Chapel Hill, 1994), 5:489; and "Hon. Robert Strange," United States Monthly 
Law Magazine 5 (1852): 321-22. On British acquiescence to the Georgia Seamen Act, 
see James Stephen to [Thomas] Lack, March 16, 1830 in Correspondence relative to the 
Prohibition against the Admission of Free Persons of Colour into certain Ports of the 
United States, 1823-1851, Series 5, Volume 579, Foreign Office Papers, UK National 
Archives, Kew, England (hereafter Correspondence), 20-22. 
13. Edward Rugemer has charted the "outside agitation" trope in certain spheres ofUnited 
States public discourse. See Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots 
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In 1835, the complementary concepts of "outside agitation" and "moral 
contagion" revealed their currency in the thunderous response to Lewis 
Tappan's polarizing abolitionist mail campaign. When Southern areas 
were inundated with hundreds of thousands of antislavery pamphlets, 
assemblies in nearly every Southern state responded in unison. They force-
fully endorsed their own unilateral authority to police their borders against 
dangerous outsiders and infectious ideas as a means to prevent slave insur-
rection. According to Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "torchlight parades, raucous 
oratory and protest meetings greeted the antislavery pamphlets" and 
"almost every major city and town in the region held anti-abolitionist ral-
lies." When four free black sailors entered Mobile, Alabama from the 
s_teamship Warsaw, and were discovered to have a package of "incendiary 
newspapers," they were immediately taken into custody. Within months, 
the state legislature decried "the malignant designs of the Abolitionists," 
who were "sending to our country their agents" and "lighting up fires of 
discord in the bosoms of our slave population." At the next state legislative 
session, the Alabama Seamen Act was codified. 14 
By the time the Alabama Seamen Act went into effect, even the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the rhetorical and legal pow~r of the con-
tagion narrative. In the 183 7 case New York v. Miln, the Court reinforced 
the power of the states to enact "precautionary measures" aimed at curtail-
ing· the introduction of "moral pestilence." In other words, local and state 
laws that served as border regulations were a central component of the 
police power and beyond federal and perhaps even judicial intervention. 
Subsequently, when the Gulf states of Mississippi (1842), Louisiana 
( 1 842), and Texas ( 1856) enacted their own restrictions against black sai-
lors, they could rely on the powerful, well-worn, and even Supreme 
Court-sanctioned concept of "moral contagion." 15 
of the American Civil War (Baton Rouge, 2007). See Tallahassee Floridian, February 21, 
1832. The Florida Seamen Act was also passed in February. The term "contagion of liberty" 
comes from the final chapter of Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967). 
14. For Southern reactions to the Mail Campaign, see Michael Kent Curtis, "Curious 
History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-1837 ," 
Northwestern University Law Review 89 ( 1995), 785-870; and Bertram Wyatt-Brown, 
"The Abolitionists' Postal Campaign of 1835," Journal of Negro History 50 (1965), 
227-38. On Alabama's reaction, see Mike Mansfield, «<An Onerous and Unnecessary 
Burden' : Mobile and the Negro Seamen Acts," Gulf South Historical Review 21 (2005): 
14-15; Resolution passed January 9, 1836 in Acts of Alabama (1835-1836), 174-75. 
Other states passed similar sorts of resolutions. For example, Acts of Virginia (1835), 
44-45; and Acts and Resolutions of North Carolina (1835- 1836), 119-21. 
15. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837), 191. 
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As powerful as the discourse of "moral contagion" became, some com-
mentators denied outright this logic undergirding the Seamen Acts. Some 
of these writers questioned the power and desire of free black sailors to 
accomplish the dreaded designs assigned them by anxious lawmakers. 
For them, no contagion existed. In South Carolina, even in the midst of 
the Vesey affair, then Governor Thomas Bennett excoriated local officials 
in Charleston who created public anxiety by conducting the trials in 
"secrecy and seclusion." Bennett's brother-in-law, Supreme Court Justice 
William Johnson, lamented the hysteria that gripped the city and its 
legal system during the trials of the conspirators. City officials were to 
blame, in Johnson's esteem, as they had grossly overreacted to "a few 
ignorant penniless unarmed uncombined fanatics." The new law was pol-
itically motivated, a way for public officers to justify their apparent lack of 
discretion. "To magnify danger," Johnson explained with extraordinary 
pithiness, "is to magnify the claims of those who arrest it." If Johnson 
had borrowed the language of his opponents, he might have said that the 
doctors had created a panic of contagion to enhance their own social 
importance. Thirty years later, some Chadestonians still denied the possi-
bility of moral contagion. In 1855, the Charleston Mercury pressed for lib-
eralization of the Seamen Act and proclaimed, "there is no danger, and in 
fact those who oppose the change know well enough that there is no 
danger." 16 
Other Southerners shared this sentiment. In 1850s Mobile, Democratic 
Party operatives denied the proposition that black sailors posed an existen-
tial threat to Alabama society. According to one editorial, "the provisions 
[of the Seamen Act] are no longer necessary" because "the poor trembling 
free blacks who come here [are] far more frightened at us terrible slave-
holders, and more in offending, than intent on doing mischief." Some 
North Carolinians, too, denied the presence of moral contagion. In 
Wilmington, British Consul Charles Peshall informed his superiors that 
most of the city's "inhabitants were averse to the law." He may have 
been correct, as North Carolina lawmakers rescinded the "quarantine" 
after only a year on the books. For historian Ira Berlin, this was proof posi-
tive that white North Carolinians "viewed black sailors as no more danger-
ous than their own free Negro populations." In many Southern port cities, 
then, critics directly questioned the veracity of the contagion narrative and 
16. Printed circular of Governor Thomas Bennett, August I 0, 1822 in Denmark Vesey: 
The Slave Conspiracy of 1822, 92. William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson, December 10, 
1822, from Donald Morgan, Justice William Johnson, The First Dissenter, 138. The 
Charleston Mercury article was reprinted in other cities. See, for example, Washington, 
DC's The National Era, December 20, 1855, 203. 
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doubted that the presence of foreign free black sailors substantially elev-
ated the likelihood of slave insurrection. 17 
The Potency of Infection 
The Southerners who denied outright the presence of "moral contagion" 
among free black sailors were certainly in the minority, especially in the 
aftermath of Nathaniel Turner's Revolt, the Christmas Rebellion and the 
abolitionist mail campaign. However, they were often joined in their deri-
sion of the laws by other, more careful commentators who questioned not 
the presence of contagion, but rather its potency. For them, free black sai-
lors did pose a threat, but that threat was relatively small. Any systematic 
attempt to exclude them would only produce resultc;; far worse than if the 
men were allowed to move about unchecked. For these critics, the threat 
of contagion paled in comparison to the economic catastrophe attending 
to the diminution of commerce. In these instances, we see what Brian 
Schoen highlighted in The Fragile Fabric of Union, a seeming paradox 
within the Cotton South between free trade purists obsessed with acceler-
ating market activity and their more socially conservative counterparts pre-
occupied with the security of the plantation. 18 
Evidence of this friction can be found across the geography and duration 
of the Seamen Acts' existence. Tn the late J 820s, Charleston merchants and 
their representatives in the General Assembly attempted time and again to 
have the law jettisoned from the statute book. In 1826, the Charleston 
Chamber of Commerce sent a lengthy memorial to the General 
Assembly requesting an amendment to the law, as its current form had 
brought "an end to our trade with British ports." The lower house agreed, 
but the state Senate fa_iled to act, earning even the scorn of the Charleston 
Mercury. In 1843, the South Carolina House once again contemplated lib-
eralization to appease "those who trade with us." No one less than 
Benjamin Hunt-the attorney who had defended the Seamen Act 20 
17. Mansfield, '"An Onerous and Unnecessary Burden,"' 21; Mobile Daily Register, 
December 19, 1856. For Peshall's remarks, see C[harles] J. Peshall to [Anthony] St. John 
Baker, December 24, 1831 , in Correspondence, 3 7-38. Ira Berlin, Slaves without 
Masters. 215-16. Berlin 's conclusion regarding the Upper South is likely correct. 
Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland never passed Seamen Acts. However, his evidence for 
North Carolina is faulty. Although the North Carolina Assembly rescinded the Seamen 
Act in 183 I, Wilmington city officials enacted municipal port regulations with a mandatory 
imprisonment feature a decade later. A copy of the regulation can be found in 
Correspondence, 96-98. 
18. Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global 
Origins of the Civil War (Baltimore, 2009), 116-18. 
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years earlier-voted in favor of amendment because of the law's effect on 
"the business of the metropolis [Charleston]."19 
In 1842, when the Alabama Seamen Act was only 3 years old, members 
of the Mobile upper crust debated the efficacy of maintaining regulations 
against free black sai lors. More commercially minded commentators feared 
that the continuance of the law would decimate the profitable Caribbean 
trade, while advocates of law-and-order lambasted city officials who did 
not thoroughly enforce the law against all incoming mariners. The law 
was left intact, although municipal authorities were reluctant to enforce 
it. For them, it was better to risk the contempt of state lawmakers than 
alienate the city's small but powerful mercantile elite. A decade later, 
Mobile Democrats led a charge to have the Seamen Act expunged from 
the books because it operated "prejudicially to the commerce of 
Mobile ... without the corresponding benefit as a measure of police protec-
tion." The law was simply an "onerous and unnecessary burden." At one 
point, local shipmasters even organized a public protest and parade in 
which they burned an effigy of an "informer" who reported to the sheriff 
infractions against the Seamen Act. 2o 
In New Orleans, the economic problems with the Seamen Act proceeded 
along similar lines but without the pageantry. Before 1852, the city's three 
municipalities operated independently, and, according to historian Richard 
Tansey, the "merchants in each district sought to increase their share of the 
city's trade by persuading the police not to seize out-of-state free blacks" as 
dictated by Louisiana law. According to one justice of the peace, "If they 
(the sailors] were to be arrested according to our ordinances, the proprietors 
would take their steamers to Lafayette where their colored employees 
would be undisturbed." The fluctuating labor market and ability of free 
blacks to drive down labor costs put law enforcement officials in an unten-
able situation. State statutes and white laborers demanded immediate incar-
ceration (at least until 1852, when the law was amended), whereas 
merchants, ship captains, and the sizable local free black population 
pressed to have the law ignored. Over the two-decade lifespan of the 
Louisiana Seamen Act, enforcement was intermittent, and incoming sailors 
were never quite sure of their fate when entering the Crescent City. By 
1852, the state legislature conceded to the economic arguments of New 
Orleans' merchants and the haphazard enforcement of local officials. 
That year, the Louisiana Seamen Act was amended _to allow maritime 
19. Charleston Courier, April II, 1826; Charleston Mercury, December 25, 1826; Alan 
January, "The First Nullification," 229-32. The debate over the House bill to amend the 
Seamen Act occurred on December 15, 1843, and is reprinted in Correspondence, 71- 74. 
20. Mansfield, "'An Onerous and Unnecessary Burden,"' 18-23. 
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workers to secure a municipal passport to allow them to come ashore. The 
fear of economic decline could prove to be as frightening as the moral con-
tagion of liberty, at least until 1859, when the mandatory imprisonment 
feature was reinstated in direct response to John Brown's raid.2 1 
In 1854, the Georgia state legislature mimicked Louisiana and liberal-
ized its Seamen Act. When it did, it conveyed its rationale in the very 
language ·or the statute. "Whereas the interests of commerce require an 
alteration of the laws now of force relating to the arrival of colored sea-
men," black sailors could remain aboard their vessels and even come 
ashore once they had received explicit permission from local authorities. 
One of the key orchestrators of the Georgia amendment was the Senate pre-
sident, whose sister was married to the British consul in Savannah. The 
consul met informally with state lawmakers and convinced them of the 
monetary benefits of adjustment. A case of champagne sealed the deal. 
Likewise, in North Carolina, both British and American merchants in 
Wilmington disparaged the 1830 Seamen Act, '\vhich shackles commerce 
much" and "will effectually destroy the British West Indian trade through-
out the state." After "five vessels from St. Vincent and Barbadoes [sic]. .. 
proceeded to New York" rather than suffer the effects of the law, the North 
Carolina Assembly rescinded the statute outright.22 
The mid-1850s was the period in which economic arguments seemed to 
make the most headway. This time period also coincided with a concerted 
effort on the part of the British Foreign Office to refrain from protesting 
against the laws to federal officials in Washington. In Georgia, Alabama, 
South Carolina, and Louisiana, the mandatory imprisonment feature was 
abandoned. In each case, British consular agents were intimately involved 
in the liberalization. Informal efforts, geared at motivating free-trade mer-
chants in state assemblies, succeeded where formal diplomatic efforts had 
failed previously. However, we must not overstate the Seamen Acts' 
demise. Texas enacted its restrictions in 1856 and Louisiana strengthened 
its own in 1859.23 
21. Richard Tansey, "Out-of-State Free BUacks in Late Antebellum New Orleans," 
Louisiana History 22 (1981), 370-75. Magistrate quote taken from New Orleans Daily 
Delta, March 27, 1851. 
22. Acts of Georgia, 1853-1854, 106-7; and Philip Hamer, "British Consuls," 143. C 
[harles] J. Peshall to [Charles] Bankhead, October 31, 1831 and C[harles] J. Peshall to 
[Anthony] St. John Baker, December 24, 1831, in Correspondence, 31 and 37-38. 
23. The most-cited scholar of the Seamen Acts, Philip Hamer concluded that British 
Consuls were successful in their diplomatic assault on the Seamen Acts, even though he 
acknowledges the statutory changes in Texas and Louisiana. See Hamer, "British 
Consuls," 167. On the complex and often contradictory representations of slaves generally, 
see Ariela Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the Antebellum Courtroom 
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Up to this point, I have emphasized the contagion narrative as a key vari-
able in the policy debates over the perceived threats of black sailors and the 
relative importance of regulating their movement in Southern port cities. 
However, the contagion narrative had direct legal consequences beyond 
its ability to sway policy makers and legislators. Considering the preva-
lence if not the unanimity of the contagion narrative, it might not be sur-
prising to find that many of the early proponents of the Seamen Acts 
described the laws as akin to quarantine measures. And as long as the 
debates over the Seamen Acts remained ensconced within the contagion-
quarantine narrative, the matter of regulation was simply an issue of poli-
cing policy. Beyond convincing lawmakers to rescind the law (or pleading 
with law enforcement to tum a blind eye), few remedies were available to 
aggrieved parties unhappy with a particular quarantine measure.24 
However, as rhetorically and constitutionally effective as the quarantine 
analogy was for the laws' defenders, it also suggested that the laws had 
potential limits in their means of enforcement. For anyone who cared to 
look, the Seamen Acts rarely operated like standard quarantine measures. 
Both the statutory language of the laws and the harsh methods of enforce-
ment undennined the laws' analogy to quarantine, and opened up the law 
to protests based on its failure to resemble laws that curbed biological co~­
taminants. Thus, the very rationale of "contagion" and ~'quarantine" that 
motivated and sanctioned the laws, also served to identify potential limits 
to the ways in which the laws might have been enforced. Because the laws 
did not resemble quarantines, some protestors argued, the laws ought to be 
changed to make the quarantine analogy applicable. To this end, -they 
chided Southern lawmakers to make good faith efforts to conform the 
Seamen Acts to quarantine measures and allow sailors to remain aboard 
their vessels. Other protestors went much further, denying that the power 
of a particular jurisdiction to restrict sailors innocent of all crime was a 
fonn of policing. Instead, they offered distinct legal challenges predicated 
on individual rights and international law, and implied that the regulatory 
(Princeton, 2000); and Sarah Roth, "Rebels and Martyrs: The Debate Over Slavery in 
American Popular Culture. 1822-1865," (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2002). 
24. On the limited legal remedies, see Roger B. Taney to Edwat'd Livingston, June 9, 
1832, Roll 73, Miscellaneous Letters, Records of the Department of State, RG 59, 
(National Archives, College Park, MD). Recently, a draft of the opinion was published by 
H. Jefferson Powell in "Attorney General Taney and the South Carolina Police Bill," 
Green Bag 5 (2001) : 75-102. 
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power of government was not limitless. Unfortunately for the sailors, these 
legal challenges only reinforced the fears of outside agitation that initially 
led to the regulation of black sailors. Consequently, no jurisdiction con-
ceded the power of individual rights to limit state power to regulate danger-
ous outsiders, whether they be morally or biologically contagious. In the 
end, nonlegal forms of resistance proved to be the most successful 
means of countering the regulations. 
The Quarantine Analogy 
Early proponents of the Seamen Acts sununoned the rhetoric of quarantine 
in the same breath in which they proclaimed the threat of "moral conta-
gion." Again, Charleston attorney Benjamin Hunt was prescient, framing 
the Seamen Acts as legally analogous to quarantine. In federal court in 
1823, Hunt proclaimed, "New-York subjects our vessels to quarantine, 
and confines our citizens to hospitals ... Yet if we confine her negro 
cooks . .. we are told it is a violation of the Constitution!. .. However, as 
New-York judges for herself upon one point, South Carolina has the 
same right to decide on the other." Some lawmakers even made the quar-
antine connection explicit within the actual statute. As mentioned, in North 
Carolina and Georgia, the laws were purposefully engrossed as "quaran-
tines." United States Attorney General and Georgia native John Benien 
agreed. In 1831, he wrote in defense of the Seamen Acts by declaring 
them identical to quarantine and beyond the reach of the federal govern-
ment. The states could adopt whatever measures they wished to protect 
the safety of their citizenry from whatever menace they identified, and 
these measures would be protected under the Tenth Amendment. Over 
time, the Taney Court would uphold state police laws such as quarantine 
aimed at stopping the introduction of dangerous people or things.25 
The terms "contagion" and "quarantine" proved to be quite valuable in 
defending the states' ability to restrict their shores against perceived threats 
and from federal intervention. However, the quarantine analogy belied the 
actual forms of regulation that Seamen Acts assumed. In three distinct 
ways, the Seamen Acts departed from other quarantine measures. 
Mandatory incarceration, slave exemptions, and the brutal treatment of 
25. See James Stephen to [Thomas] Lack, March 16, 1830, in Correspondence, 20-22. 
Berrien 's opinion can be found in United States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Commerce Committee, Free Colored Seamen-Majority and Minority Reports, 27 Cong., 
3 sess., Jan. 20, 1843, 49-58. See also Michael Schoeppner, "Legitimating Quarantine: 
Moral Contagions, the Commerce Clause, and the Limits of Gibbons v. Ogden," Journal 
of Southern Legal History 17 (2009): 81-120; New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); 
The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847). 
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the sailors undermined the analogy and provoked questions about the func-
tional limits of regulatory authority. 
Nearly every Seamen Act contained an immediate incarceration feature. 
Although some states allowed intermittently for black mariners to remain 
on board their ships, imprisonment was the standard mode of enforcement, 
at least until the early-to-mid-1850s. North Carolina was the exception that 
proved the rule. Its initial statute in 1830 did not include a mandatory incar-
ceration feature, only requiring vessels with free black sailors to ride quar-
antine for 30 days. However, the law did not survive its first judicial test. In 
superior court, Judge Robert Strange instructed the jury to consider the 
quarantine unconstitutional because of its ineffectiveness. For Strange, a 
30 day quarantine, after which the sailors would have free rein, did not 
remedy the infection. "How then," one report paraphrased Strange's 
charge, "is the nuisance removed or the danger lessened by this law?" 
Although Strange did not proclaim that imprisonment was necessary, the 
only realistic way for the state to keep its Seamen Act and still allow 
many foreign ships to dock was to confine the sailors. At the next session 
of the North Carolina General Assembly, state lawmakers repealed the law, 
and a few years later, the Wilmington municipal authorities reinstated a 
similar code with an imprisonment mandate. 26 
In Charleston, New Orleans, Mobile, and other Southern port cities, jails 
were segregated by race. The detainment facilities that held black Atlantic 
sailors also housed delinquent local slaves and free people of color. In 
other words, most Seamen Acts required that "morally contagious" sailors 
be held in close proximity to the most "susceptible, population in the city. 
· Some contemporaries noted the obvious problems associated with the 
forced detainment of sailors in jail, especially considering how naturally 
the discussions of the Seamen Acts became part of a larger question of 
quarantine. Supreme Court Justice William Johnson retorted, "If there 
are evil persons abroad who would steal to this place [Charleston] and 
do us mischief. .. then this method of disposing of offenders by detaining 
them here [in jail] presents the finest facilities in the world for ... pursuing 
their designs." In a similar vein, an attorney for the King of England 
informed the Foreign Office in I 832 that the incarceration mandate was 
certainly "a misapplication of quarantine" and unconnected with "the pres-
ervation of health." The president of the British Board of Trade in 1824 
went even further, "These Yankees may kidnap one another, but they 
must not kidnap British subjects." With less vitriol, the British consul in 
26. For a copy of Judge Strange's charge to the jury, in which he articulated this interpret-
ation of the law, see Correspondence, 36. For a reprint of the Wilmington code, see 
Correspondence, 98. 
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Charleston sent a letter to the state governor in 1853. The law was obnox-
ious not because it singled out free blacks, but because it "conveyed 
[British Seamen] as felons through the public streets." In 1844, a joint com-
mittee in the Massachusetts General Court used similar language when it 
lambasted South Carolina for "casting [crewmen] into prison ... without 
the necessity of alleging against them the commission of any crime."27 
Beyond mandatory imprisonment, the statutory language of the Seamen 
Acts also contained another problematic feature that undermined their cor-
relation to quarantines. Every single Seamen Act in the United States, with-
out exception, specifically barred "free people of color," "free blacks," or 
"free negroes." In no jurisdiction did the law against maritime workers 
extend to slaves. As a class, they were entirely exempt. The pervasiveness 
of slave exemptions within the language of the statues suggests this was no 
simple oversight. In fact, as the Georgia legislature contemplated enacting 
its first "quarantine" in 1829, Governor George Gilmer sought to have the 
restriction apply not only to free blacks, but to slaves from Maryland and 
Virginia as well. The Georgia Assembly chose to ignore Gilmer's sugges-
tion, leaving slaves out of the new regulation.28 
One early case from South Carolina is also illustrative. James Calder was 
a British merchant who lived in Charleston and invested in a British sloop 
that made regular runs out of the city. When his vessel arrived in January 
1823, a deputy sheriff boarded it and interrogated the crew. Hoping to 
avoid the potentially harsh slave codes, the deckhands all claimed to be 
free men of color, obviously ignorant of the new law against free black sai-
lors. Their declarations caused their immediate· arrests. In court, Calder 
explained that his men were not actually free, as they claimed during the 
interrogation, but his slaves. As the statute did not explicitly include slaves, 
Calder argued, their arrests were in error. Therefore, the state should release 
his men and refund his jail fees. The state constitutional court found 
Calder's argument persuasive. They read the statute narrowly and agreed 
that slaves ought to be exempt from the law. If the legislature had wished 
to include slaves in the quarantine, it would have specified so in the statute 
itself. Because of this finding and the legal assumption of slave status for 
all people of color in South Carolina, the burden of proving the men's free 
status fell back on the state. When the prosecution could not offer any 
27. Johnson quote found in Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (1823), 496. W[illiam] 
Huskisson to [Joseph) Planta, February 4, 1824 and Herbert Jenner to Viscount Palmerston, 
March 23, 1832, both in Correspondence, 6 and 39-40. For the confidential letter to the 
South Carolina Governor, see Hamer, "British Consuls," 164. A copy of the declaration 
issued by the joint commission in the Massachusetts General Court is reprinted in Niles' 
National Register, february 22, 1845, 394-399. 
28. Hasan Crocket, "The Incendiary Pamphlet," 310. 
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further evidence to prove that the sailors were free, judgment was filed for 
Calder, and he received his refund.29 
But why should slaves be exempt if the goal of the Seamen Act was to 
prevent the introduction of "morally contagious, abolitionist ideas? 
Certainly slaves were as susceptible to such "ailments" of liberty as free 
people of color. They could just as easily transmit dangerous ideas to 
local slaves. After all, was not Denmark Vesey himself a slave when he 
became infected by his Atlantic travels? And was not the overarching fear 
that free black sailors would "infect" slaves if they were allowed free access 
to the wharves in Southern port cities? So why would slaves be exempt in 
every single statute unless the actual goal had little to do with abolitionist 
speech or writing? Curiously, however, commentators at the time rarely 
pointed to this obvious paradox in the so-called racial quarantines. 30 
Third, the forms of enforcement further undermined the quarantine ana-
logy and blazed a path for specific legal and constirutional attacks aga'inst 
the Seamen Acts. I opened this article with a brief description ·of Amos 
Daley. In 1824, he entered the Charleston port aboard the schooner Fox, 
where he was arrested and hauled to the local jail. After his arguments con-
cerning the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
failed, Daley was taken to the local whipping post outside the slave work-
house and given thirteen lashes. 3 1 Nearly 20 years later, a British sailor 
named John Jones was imprisoned in Charleston, and during his confine-
ment, the city jailor told Jones to sweep the jailhouse. Initially, the mariner 
obliged. Later, some slaves who were incarcerated with Jones told him that 
his chore was usually reserved for slaves. A few days later, when the jailor 
again told Jones to sweep the facility, he refused. The jailor proceeded to 
beat Jones with a stick for his recalcitrance. The beating was so severe that 
Jones's captain complained to the British Consul, who then forwarded 
news of the incident to the Foreign Office. The severity of Jones's injuries 
even flabbergasted South Carolina Governor and rabid firebrand James 
Henry Hammond. 32 
29. Calder v. Deliesseline, Harper 186 (South Carolina Constitutional Court, 1824); and 
James Calder to Consul Moodie, January 15, 1823 in Correspondence, 2-3. 
30. See, for example, Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, ''The People's Darling 
Privilege": Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, 2000). 
31. State v. Daley was reprinted in Charleston Mercury, June 23, 1824. 
32. For Fraser, see William Ogilby to C[harles] R. Vaughn, November 29, 1830, in 
Correspondence, 23-24. Diplomatic reverberations are found through the next five pages. 
For Jones, see William Ogilby to Sheriff of Charleston, November 3, 1843 and William 
Ogilby to Earl of Aberdeen, November 4, 1843, both in Correspondence, 62-63. For 
Hammond's response, see Message of the Governor of South Carolina, November 30, 
1843, reprinted in Correspondence, 69. See also Carol Bleser, ed., Secret and Sacred: 
The Diaries of James Henry Hammond, a Southern Slaveholder (New York, 1988), 117. 
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The poor treatment of sailors in jail was not confined to Charleston. In 
Mobile, a stewardess named Mary Frances Roberts was removed from her 
vessel and placed in jail according to the 1837 Alabama Seamen Act. The 
toothless white jailor must have fancied Roberts, the world traveler. He 
attempted to woo Mary by complimenting her on her extensive travels 
and her beaming set of pearly whites. When his seduction failed, he turned 
to force. According to her affidavit, Mary barely escaped him, thanks lar-
gely to a random passer-by who distracted her assailant. When she talked 
about the ·episode to a fellow prisoner, she discovered that most of the 
female inmates, all slaves, faced similar advances-turned-assaults. The 
next day, Mary informed her captain, who then sought legal counsel in 
hopes of drawing up charges against the jailor. 33 
New Orleans was nearly as nefarious, at least when the law was actually 
being enforced. Law enforcement officials seemingly used unsuspecting 
sailors as a reserve workforce. One justice of the peace routinely sent sai-
lors to the slave workhouse rather than the parish prison, as state law 
required. From the workhouse, the sailors were doled out to municipal 
authorities and private contractors. At one point, if we believe reports in 
the National Anti-Slavery Standard, the city's detainment facilities main-
tained a multitude of sailors who had been in custody from 6 months to 
3 years. Abolitionists claimed to have letters written by such sailors, 
who begged for family and friends to send money lest they remain perma-
nent fixtures in the city jails. Especially after 1850, abolitionist periodicals 
routinely harped on morally derelict captains and the conniving jailors of 
New Orleans. Even the governor of the Bahamas warned sailors and the 
Colonial Office about this prototype of convict leasing. 34 
In 1835, a local justice of the peace in Key West, Florida, sentenced a 
free black Bahamian sailor named William Forster to 5 years' enslavement 
according to the territory's Seamen Act. Later that week, Forster was sold to 
the highest bidder. The winner of the auction, the man who would literally 
own Forster for the next half decade, happened to be the very magistrate 
who sentenced him. When news of Forster's enslavement, not to mention 
the obvious conflict of interest surrounding his eventual purchase, hit the 
British Foreign Office, its diplomats demanded the immediate intervention 
of the United States Department of State. Citing international law and bilat-
eral treaty agreements, Foreign Secretary Palmerston pressed for Forster's 
33. The deposition of Mary Frances Roberts was enclosed in Consul Grigg to Viscount 
Palmerston, January 25, 1848, in Correspondence, 113-14. 
34. National Anti-Slavery Standard, October 8 and October 15, 1846; George B. Shauock, 
The Bahamian /s/and'i (New York, 1905), 563-65; and Wong, Neither Fugitive Nor Free, 
184-239. 
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immediate release. In apologetic terms but sarcastic tones, the Jackson 
administration refused to intercede, a.nd the British were not prepared to 
reinforce diplomatic pressure with economic or military threats.35 
For these commentators, the Seamen Acts had nothing to do with the 
quarantine of moral contagion. But such a conclusion only holds if we 
assume that the moral contagion was confined to abolitionist speech or 
antislavery literature. If that was the extent of the contagio"n, then these 
objectors to the laws-as-quarantines had legitimate qualms. However, the 
statutes and their enforcement suggest an alternative understanding of con-
tagion. Apparently, the sailors were not just perceived simply as distribu-
tors of dangerous words; they were seen as living examples of legal 
alternatives to race-based, chattel slavery as the foundation for the social 
order. White Southerners routinely used law and custom to marginalize 
local free blacks and attempt to prove the totality of white hegemony. 
Sojourning free black sailors, on the other hand, lived outside this power 
structure, and their mobility and autonomy served as obvious examples 
of the geographic limits of that hegemony. In this view the contagion 
was autonomy, the presence of people of color existing beyond the legal 
scope of local and state lawmakers. The message, then, was actually 
inscribed on the very bodies of the free sailors and transmitted by the 
work they commenced on the docks and wharves. lf the mariners were 
simply left aboard their vessels, they c~uld still be a shining example of 
the spatial limits of legal authority. But by bringing the black workers 
ashore in chains, by whipping them at slave whipping posts, by attempting 
to rape them, by forcing them to work on plantations, or by literally enslav-
ing them, enforcers of the Seamen Acts could powerfully and vis~bly 
extend their own authority. They could use the relative autonomy of the 
sailors to their own ends by stripping the sailors of that autonomy.36 
35. Viscount Palmerston to Charles Vaughn, September 23, 1835; Charles Bankhead to 
Viscount Palmerston, December 5, 1835; Charles Bankhead to United States Secretary of 
State [John] Forsyth, November 14, 1835; John Forsyth to [Charles] Bankhead, 
November 20, 1835; and Charles Bankhead to Viscount Palmcrston, December 21 , 1835, 
all found in Correspondence, 47-50. In South Carolina (for a time), Florida, Texas, and 
Mississippi, the Jaw pennitted the courts to sentence repeat violators to enslavement. This 
facet of the law earned the ire of Atlantic abolitionist groups, who often proclaimed that 
Southern courts enslaved hundreds of sailors each year. Although court records cannot sus-
tain them, these stories of punitive enslavement gained increasing currency in the late 1840s 
and into the 1850s, and swayed public opinion in parts of the North and Great Britain. See 
Wong, Neither Fugitive Nor Free, 183-239. 
36. This analysis of the enforcement mechanisms echoes the work of Orlando Patterson. 
In his groundbreaking book, Slavery and Social Death, Patterson describes a process by 
which slaveowners took "control of symbolic instruments" that isolated the slave "from 
all 'rights' or claims of birth" or "any legitimate social order." The state either abetted 
580 Law and History Review, August 2013 
As a result, the more the sailors and their agents resisted the Seamen 
Acts, the more the sailors exercised autonomy, the greater the perceived 
necessity of quarantine and the greater the symbolic value of degradation. 
A brief example will suffice. When John Jones refused to sweep the 
Charleston jail in 1843, his act of defiance only reinforced the represen-
tation of Jones-the-autonomous-sailor as existing beyond the usual power 
oflocal law. By defying the jailor, Jones was exhibiting the sort of political 
activity that was supposed to be quarantined aboard his ship. When the 
jailor used direct, physical violence and maimed Jones, he enhanced the 
symbolism of the degradation and once again removed the "contagion" 
of autonomy. Even the testimony of the jailor confirmed that his use of 
force was the best way to stem Jones's public insubordination and to pre-
vent slaves from imitating Jones's defiance.37 
Forms of Resistance 
The imperfect relationship between standard quarantines and most of the 
Seamen Acts motivated some sailors and their agents to formally contest 
the laws as inappropriate exercises of regulatory authority. Some couched 
their arguments within the discourse of individual rights, seeing liberty of 
movement as a barrier to the police power. In 1823, a Jamaican mulatto 
named Henry Elkison sued in federal court, claiming that existing 
Anglo-American treaties protected him while working in Charleston. The 
1815 Commercial Convention between the United States and Great 
Britain specifically prevented the passage of laws "abridging their 
[British subjects] rights to free ingress and egress, and occupying houses 
and warehouses for the purposes of commerce." Elkison stoutly declared 
his status as a bona fide British subject and the inclusion of black sailors 
under the broad protections of the 1815 treaty. According to Elkison, his 
subjecthood rested on his birth. He was born free in Jamaica, a British 
dominion; therefore, he was a subject of the British king. Elkison ended up 
actively in this process, or removed itself from the master-slave relationship so as to render 
the master's control over his slave's social life complete. Symbolic actions were crucial in 
constructing the legal parameters of slavery and enforcing control of servile populations. 
The legal edifice on which slavery was sustained relied on performative practices that under-
scored the slave's alienation from the formal social and legal order. The stories of these sai-
lors complicate Patterson's notion of natal alienation precisely because they were not slaves. 
The treatment they received was a direct function of their non-slave status. Orlando 
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge, MA, 1982). 
3 7. The jailor's version of the events, which largely reinforce this contempt for autonomy, 
can be found in Message of the Governor of South Carolina, November 30, 1843, reprinted 
in Correspondence, 69- 70. 
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losing his case because of a jurisdictional problem with his habeas corpus 
petition, but Justice William Johnson denied the quarantine analogy, accepted 
the sailor's claim as a British subject, and declared him eligible to work with-
out molestation in the United States. In the aftermath of the case, several pro-
minent South Carolinians debated whether or not Jamaican mulattoes were 
really rights-bearing subjects of the British Crown.38 
Similarly, in 1852, a British sailor named Reuben Roberts sued 
Charleston Sheriff Jeremiah Yates for damages, claiming his arrest under 
the Seamen Act violated his rights as a British subject as outlined in 
trade agreements made between the United States and Britain. Roberts 
lost his case in federal court, and the British Foreign Office forced the sai-
lor to drop his suit just before it emerged on the United States Supreme 
Court docket. Apparently, the new Tory ministry hoped to leverage the 
threat of an adverse Supreme Court decision to persuade South Carolina 
officials to rescind the statute voluntarily. That same year, a Portuguese 
cook named Manual Pereira sought a writ of habeas corpus in state 
court in South Carolina. The mariner cited treaties the United States had 
signed with Britain (he was aboard a British vessel) and with Portugal, 
the latter of which specifically protected "reciprocal liberty of commerce 
and navigation" to "the citizens and subjects of their respective states." 
Like Roberts and Elkison, Pereira claimed that his freeborn birth on 
Portuguese soil entitled him to protections as outlined in the treaty. An 
appellate court in South Carolina threw out the case after Pereira was 
released from custody and escorted out of the state. In no case in the ante-
bellum era did claims of individual rights, predicated on existing treaty 
law, succeed in either state or federal court. 39 
Claims of individual rights were not limited to international seamen. As 
mentioned previously, Amos Daley contested his imprisonment in 1824, 
claiming (among other things) that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
in the Constitution guaranteed him, a citizen of Rhode Island, open access 
to the ports of Charleston. He carried with him freedom papers, ·and his 
captain and first mate swore under oath that Daley was a state citizen of 
38. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (1823). Michael Schoeppner, "Status across 
Borders in the Age of Emancipation: Roger Taney, Black British Subjects, and a 
Diplomatic Antecedent to Dred Scott," Journal of American History (forthcoming). 
39. Mathew to Malmesbury, April 24, 1852, in Correspondence, 242-44. A reprint of 
Pereira's petition is enclosed with Mathew to Malmesbury, May 1, 1852, in 
Correspondence, 255-58. Ex-Parte Pereira, 6 Rich. 149 (1853), also reprinted in 
Correspondence, 266; Francis C. Adams, Manuel Pereira: or, The Sovereign Rule of 
South Carolina with views of Southern Laws, Life, and Hospitality (Washington, DC, 
1853); Roberts v. Yates, 20 F. Cas. 937 (I 853). 
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Rhode Island. Their personal knowledge of Daley and his parents served to 
reinforce his political legitimacy. In their eyes as in Daley's, his free birth, 
personal relationships, and legal documents were enough to establish his 
citizenship credentials. And attached to those credentials was a consti-
tutional right to move freely about the country.40 
Similar sorts of rights claims were brought before legislatures as well. In 
1823, a collection of "Northern Masters" petitioned the federal House of 
Representatives to intercede and preempt the South Carolina Seamen 
Act. For the petitioners, in addition to its unconstitutional intenuption of 
interstate commerce, the Law also "infringed on the rights of freemen" as 
laid out in the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Similarly, in 1842, a 
group of African-Americans in Boston resolved to petition Congress for 
intercession in the Seamen Acts. Their argument must have been somewhat 
persuasive, as a group of prominent white Bostonians seconded their pos-
ition and also memorialized Congress. Among the names on the petition of 
protest was that of future Supreme Court justice and dissenter in Dred 
Scott, Benjamin R. Curtis. They hoped Congress would "grant them [the 
sailors] relief, and render effectual in their behalf the privileges of citizen-
ship secured by the Constitution."41 
A community of Afro-Britons in the Bahamas shared a similar con-
ception of rights when they came together to protest the atrocious treatment 
of their countrymen in the . maritime industry. They petitioned Colonial 
Governor John Gregory and implicitly Queen Victoria in their 1850 mem-
orial against the Seamen Acts in force in the United States. They praised 
British emancipation, by which the Crown "was pleased to extend the bles-
sings of freedom" to "coloured subjects .. . with a view of raising them in the 
scale of society" and "by which they became entitled to exercise all the 
rights and privileges of British subjects." But the Seamen Acts betrayed 
the promise of emancipation because "Her Majesty's coloured subjects do 
not enjoy the same privileges as the whites are allowed on their arrival as 
British subjects at any of the Southern ports of the United States of 
40. This was certainly the case in Wilmington, North Carolina, where British consul 
Charles Peshall forced two sailors to break quarantine, and then underwrote from personal 
funds the suit bringing the state Seamen Act before the North Carolina Superior Court. 
See letters between Peshall and the British Consulate General in Correspondence, 31-36. 
For the story of Daley, see Charleston Mercury, June 23, 1824. 
41 . "Memorial of sundry masters of American vessels lying in the port of Charleston, 
S.C.," Niles' Weekly Register, March 15, 1823, 31 -32. "Resolutions Adopted at a 
Meeting of Boston Negroes, October 27, 1842" reprinted in Liberator, November 4, 
1842, 174-75. The memorial to Congress is reprinted in United States Congress, House 
of Representatives, Commerce Committee, Free Colored Seamen- Majority and Minority 
Reports, 27 Cong., 3 sess., Jan. 20, 1843, 7-9. See also, Wong, Neither Fugitive Nor 
Free, 187- 88. 
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America." In their esteem, the Crown was obligated to demand from the 
United States the equal protection of treaty law by preventing Southern 
officials from perpetrating "indignity[ies) unbecoming the subject[s] of 
Her Majesty. "42 
Nearly identical language flowed from the pens of state officials in 
Massachusetts. In the early 1840s, the state sent noted Concord attorney 
Samuel Hoar to Charleston to initiate a suit in federal court on behalf of 
any incarcerated sailors from Massachusetts. After Hoar was escorted (or 
evicted, as accounts vary) out of South Carolina, a joint committee in 
the Massachusetts legislature wrote an elaborate rebuke regarding the 
fiasco. In it, the committee denied that South Carolina "has a right to 
inflict corporal punishment, by the application of the lash ... upon the per-
sons or citizens of Massachusetts." It also questioned the right of any state 
"to punish by fine and imprisonment, any citizen coming from another 
state." Along these lines, the police powers of the states had stark and 
finite limits, some of which were defined by the rights of individual per-
sons and citizens moving across the nation.43 
These rights claims lodged to or by executive and legislative authorities 
failed as miserably as those made in federal and state courts. In 1823, 1843, 
1850, and 1860, Congress flatly refused to intercede either in its capacity to 
regulate interstate commerce or in recognition of black citizenship rights, 
assuming any action would initiate disunion. The British Foreign Office, 
too, never supplemented diplomatic pressure with economic sanctions or 
military threats. Even at the height of Whig progressivism in the 1830s, 
it never moved beyond supplication, and none of the antebellum 
Anglo-American treaties ever mentioned Afro-British sailors. On the one 
recorded occasion when a British captain threatened to mount his canons 
if Wilmington officials tried to remove his black sailors, the Foreign 
Office refused to endorse his actions. Even the rhapsody of scorn 
flowing from the state of Massachusetts lacked "manly bearing," to borrow 
the words of abolitionist editor David Child. Even though Bay State 
lawmakers proclaimed that a "resort to arms" would be justified to defend 
their black citizens, they nonetheless refused "to give loose to a spirit of 
retaliation" and, instead, offered only an "earnest appeal."44 
42. "Memorial to his Excellency John Gregory ... ," in Correspondence, 132- 33. 
43 . "Massachusetts & South Carolina", Niles National Register, February 22, 1845, 
394-99. 
44. The one instance of armed resistance by a captain was the Susan King fiasco in 
Wilmington in 1846, and the British Foreign Office did not condone the action. See 
Correspondence, 90-99. David Child quote from "Mr. Child's Speech", Liberator, July 
27, 1833, 105. "Massachusetts & South Carolina", Niles National Register, February 22, 
1845, 394-99. 
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In both the United States and Great Britain, some jurists denied outright 
the power of individual rights or international law to impair the Seamen 
Acts in particular or regulatory authority generally, regardless of the 
color of the individual. But even for those who might have been flirting 
with the idea of rights as a shield against government, the protection of 
black rights was easily bartered for other political or economic concems.45 
Formal assaults on the Seamen Acts faltered with these failures of 
rights claims in Congress, in court, and in Anglo-American diplomacy. 
Unsurprisingly, informal and extralegal resistance proved far more effec-
tive in combating the laws and securing liberalization. In fact, when 
objectors couched their protests in terms of noblesse oblige, economic 
calculus, or even Victorian sexual nonns, they were much more successful 
in securing liberalization of the laws or a relaxation in enforcement. In 
other words, when the laws' detra<;:tors approached the Seamen Acts as a 
matter of policy to be corrected by Southern authorities-as opposed to 
a matter of international or constitutional Jaw to be determined by others 
-they were much more successful. 
In February, 1846, a British missionary to Jamaica named Hope Waddell 
entered a port in Mississippi as a result of shipwreck. He arrived with his 
wife, four young children, and "a maid-servant of the coloured class named 
Frances Moulton, aged between eleven and twelve years."·When the young 
girl was taken off the vessel under the state's Seamen Act, Waddell hailed 
the local British consul, begging him to interfere to protect the rights of 
the "young. . . British subject." The consul doubted anything could be 
done, but he nonetheless provided a letter to the mayor begging that the 
child be released from custody and placed back in Waddell's care. 
Interestingly, the letter did not harp on international relations or the sanctity 
of the Union Jack. Rather, the letter sought an exemption for the young 
Moulton "in consideration not only for the unfortunate circumstance 
which forced us. . . into that port, but also for her tender years and her 
being engaged in waiting on [Waddell's] children, who might suffer 
from the loss of her services." The mayor instructed the district attorney 
to refrain from issuing an order of arrest, and after taking careful measure-
ment of Moulton 's adolescent body, the court allowed her to stay in 
WaddeiJ's care, so long as they made quick exit from the state.46 
We have already heard part of the story of Mary Roberts, the British 
stewardess who narrowly escaped the sexual advances of the Mobile jailor. 
45. See, for example, Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling 
Privilege": Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, 2000). 
and Clement Eaton, Freedom of Thought in the Old South (New York, 1951 ). 
46. John Scobie to Viscount Palmerston, September 25, 1846, in Correspondence, 91- 94. 
Peculiar Quarantines 585 
After hearing Roberts's story, her captain hired an attorney and filed a com-
plaint against the jailor. Although no formal charges ever materialized, the 
episode provided significant leverage for the British Consul in Mobile and 
the Foreign Office. Rather than confront Alabama officials with legalistic 
language harping on the individual rights of the stewardess, they instead 
tapped into prevailing gender and racial norms to amplify the jailor's trans-
gression and illustrate the potential danger of mandatory incarceration. In 
other words, the jailor's behavior was reprehensible not because he vio-
lated the legal rights of a British subject, but because he abused his 
power and authority over a defenseless and/or racially inferior woman. 
He was contemptible more for his violation of well-established, 
Victorian sexual norms than for his degradation of the Union Jack. 
British negotiators capitalized on Roberts's unfortunate experience by 
emphasizing the possibility of similar transgressions in the future. At 
their next session, Alabama lawmakers removed the immediate incarcera-
tion feature from the statute book.47 
The most amazing example is the story of William Forster, the 
Bahamian sailor sentenced to 5 years' enslavement in Key West. As 
Crown officials disputed among themselves and as the Foreign Office 
revealed the limits of its displeasure, Forster's former captain came to 
the mariner's rescue. For reasons unrecorded, he returned to Key West, 
sought out Forster's owner, and bought back his former employee. 
Although the Florida court had demanded Fraser serve for 5 years, his cap-
tain's purse was enough to countermand the dictates of the court's ruling. 
In all, Forster lived as an American slave for less than 6 months.48 
As historian Philip Hamer has shown, the British Foreign Office even-
tually realized the benefits of informal and nonlegal "negotiations." By 
1853, the British Foreign Office decided to make informal manipulation 
the modus operandi for dealing with the Seamen Acts. Consequently, it 
forced Reuben Roberts to drop his suit against Charleston Sheriff 
Jeremiah Yates just as the case was about to come before the United 
States Supreme Court. South Carolina lawmakers eventually responded 
to Britain's "attitude of friendly remonstrance" by amending its law to 
allow British sailors to remain aboard their vessels and even ·to come 
ashore if they secured a passport from municipal officials. As mentioned 
earlier, the British consul in Savannah helped procure a similar sort of 
relaxation when he convinced the president of the state senate, a relative 
of the consul's wife, to author an amendment. There was not talk of rights~ 
47. W. Giffard Nicolas to Viscount Palmerston, May 25, 1848, in Correspondence, 
122-23; and Acts of Alabama ( 1848), 130-31. 
48. Documents regarding the Forster affair can be found in Correspondence, 47-50. 
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of treaty violations, of a degraded Union Jack; there were only informal 
talks among very prominent and wealthy members of the Savannah elite. 
And when the Louisiana legislature reinstated the immediate incarceration 
feature in 1859, the British .Consul in New Orleans was able to exploit the 
economic needs of New Orleans' merchants to convince the municipal 
police chief to ignore Afro-British sailors, although Northern 
African-Americans were still targeted. In short. when British merchants, 
consuls, and diplomats emphasized policy instead of law, Southern policy 
makers often honored the efforts. Interestingly, this shift away from black 
rights by British officials mirrored a larger cultural shift away from the 
racial progressivism of the 1830s. It is little wonder that informal, nonlegal 
British efforts in this context of the 1850s were more successful than 
counterparts from the Northern United States, where abolitionists and anti-
slavery constitutionalists were gaining public support.49 
Conclusion 
Although overtly constitutional issues such as the Commerce Clause and 
citizenship are vital elements of the legal history of the Seamen Acts, 
the laws also offer an excellent vantage point from which to explore regu-
latory authority in the Old South. They provide detailed examples of how a 
particular form of regulation was envisioned, enacted, and enforced. They 
also highlight some of the political and legal dynamics at work when var-
ious groups confronted, defended, and protested this species of regulatory 
law. Because the Seamen Acts so blatantly deviated from regular sorts of 
border enforcement measures such as quarantine, critics crafted complex 
arguments based on individual rights to refute the unilateral power of 
state governments to police their shores. Although these legal challenges 
were largely unsuccessful, their very mention made informal suggestions 
for moderate amendments all the more palatable. When lawmakers 
responded to these less confrontational overtures and removed the harshest 
features of enforcement, they dulled the sting of rights-based protests and 
appeased British consular agents and local merchants at the same time. 
49. Philip Hamer, "British Consuls and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860." On British 
views toward emancipation and colonial racial policy, see Catherine Hall, Civilising 
Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago, 2002). 
On public perceptions of slave character, see Roth, "Rebels and Martyrs." On antislavery 
constitutionalism, see William Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in 
America, 176Q-1 848 (Ithaca, NY, 1977). 
